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I. INTRODUCTION

Professor Christopher Wonnell's excellent paper, Erpectation,
Reliance, and the Two Contractual Wrongs,' makes two basic points,
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia. Ph.D. 1992, University of
Pennsylvania; J.D. 1986, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 1982, Yale
University. I thank Kevin Kordana for helpful comments.
1. Christopher T. Wonnell, Expectation, Reliance, and the Two Contractual
Wrongs, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 53 (2001).

both of which I find convincing, but neither of which contract scholars
generally appreciate and accept. The first point, largely descriptive and
so less controversial, is that the concepts of expectation and reliance are
not simply two different ways of conceiving compensation; rather, they
are two different ways of conceiving contractual wrongs from both a
moral and an economic perspective.2 From a moral perspective,
expectation damages remedy the wrong of breaching a contractual
promise that should have been performed. Reliance damages remedy
the wrong of encouraging reliance through a contractual promise that
either should not have been made or should no longer be performed.
From an economic perspective, expectation damages focus on deterring
wrongful breaches. Reliance damages focus on deterring wrongful
contracting behavior other than breach. The second point, normative
and highly controversial, is that courts should choose between
expectation and reliance remedies depending on the reason for the
breach.3 Several years ago, I tried to make similar points in an article
that Wonnell generously includes in the pantheon he parades in the last
section of his article,' so the fact that I mostly agree with him is not all
that surprising.
What has been surprising to me is how strong the resistance (if only
tacit) is to Wonnell's second point-that the reason for the breach
matters in determining the appropriate contractual remedy in general and
the choice between expectation and reliance damages in particular. Save
for occasional forays into punitive damages, 5 and discussions of limited
remedies in excuse cases, 6 one can search high and low in the many fine
casebooks, compilations of essays, treatises, and texts on contract law
published in the last several years, for example, and find nary a mention
of this simple, yet powerful, idea.7 Why? Perhaps it is our yearning for
2. Id.at56-58,88.
3. Id. at 90-91 (proposing principles for choosing between expectation and
reliance remedies), 123 (noting that the "fundamental issue" in choosing between
expectation and reliance "is the motive for particular contract breaches").
4. Id. at 98-133. The article of mine that Wonnell discusses, id. at 106-09, is
George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in ContractDamages, 80 VA. L. REv. 1225 (1994).
Aside from responding to Wonnell's critique of my article, I will for the most part not
address Wonnell's critiques of the other scholars who have written in this area. These
critiques are excellent, and I do not have much to add to them. Thus, I will focus on
Wonnell's own theory.
5. For the most recent discussion and defense of punitive damages in contract,
see William S. Dodge, The Casefor Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629
(1999).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 158 (allowing restitution and
reliance damages in mistake cases), § 272 (allowing restitution and reliance damages in
impracticability cases) (1981).
7. For notable exception, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
130 (5th ed. 1998) ("It makes a difference in deciding which remedy to grant whether the
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the elusive grand, unifying theory of contract, which for some reason
requires a unitary remedial interest. If so, I think Wonnell's article
should help to foster the notion that we can accommodate both
expectation and reliance damages as coequal partners in a larger theory
of contractual obligation, rather than viewing one measure as simply an
inconvenient exception or qualification to the theoretically dominant
position of the other.
Perhaps, however, the objection to what I have previously called a
"fault-based" damage regime is more pragmatic or ideological than
theoretical. In this view, courts cannot or should not get into the messy
business of distinguishing contractual breaches because the costs will be
too great and courts will be too prone to err. Wonnell is in fact
sympathetic to this view (which appears to be the dominant view among
both traditional and economically oriented contract scholars), and this is
probably our key area of disagreement. Our disagreement, though, may
be more one of emphasis than substance-especially at the level of
generality at which Wonnell is working (he mostly discusses
hypothetical examples, whereas I prefer cases). As I will discuss, I think
Wonnell's own analysis helps to demonstrate not only that courts can
make fault-based distinctions as part of determining the proper
contractual remedy, but that they should, and inevitably will, make such
distinctions. I would therefore encourage Wonnell, and those who find
his analysis convincing, to embrace a fault-based damage regime rather
than try to cabin it as much as possible.
In the sections that follow, I will briefly summarize Wonnell's
argument, then offer some friendly critiques of some of his examples
and proposals. Because I largely agree with Professor Wonnell (and
have stated my views on this subject elsewhere9) these comments may
appear more critical than I intend them to be. I hope, however, that the
comments serve to stimulate careful reading and consideration of
Wonnell's article.

breach was opportunistic."). Posner does not, however, use this idea to distinguish
between expectation and reliance damage remedies.
8. Cohen, supra note 4, at 1226.
9. Cohen, supra note 4.

II. WONNELL'S SIX MOTIVES FOR MAKING AND
BREAKING CONTRACTS

Wonnell begins his analysis with a series of six hypothetical examples
designed to show that the nature of the breach determines whether courts
should award expectation or reliance damages.'" The first four examples
involve opportunistic breaches," for which Wonnell finds expectation
damages appropriate. 2 The last two examples involve nonopportunistic
breaches, for which Wonnell finds reliance damages at least potentially
appropriate. 3 Wonnell has done a great service in fleshing out the
notion of opportunistic versus nonopportunistic breach, and for the most
part, I agree with his characterizations and conclusions in the six
examples. However, I would use a somewhat different route to get to
those conclusions, so I will discuss Wonnell's examples in some detail.
A.

OpportunisticBreaches

Wonnell's challenge in his first four examples is to show why the
examples involve opportunistic breach and why expectation damages are
more appropriate than reliance damages for such breaches. 4 In Case 1,
after the promisee performs his half of a baseball card trade, the
promisor decides to keep the promisee's card and not perform her half of
the trade. 5 In Case 2, the promisee makes a relationship-specific
investment, after which the promisor attempts to convince the promisee
to agree to a modification of the original contract. When the promisee
rebuffs the promisor's attempt, the promisor breaches. 6 In Case 3, an
insurer breaches an insurance contract after a loss covered by the policy
occurs." In Case 4, the promisor breaches a contract after discovering
that the promisee has used the contract to take advantage of information
the promisee possessed but the promisor did not.'
10. Wonnell, supra note 1, at 60-79.
11. Wonnell in this section explicitly labels only Case 1, id. at 60-61, and Case 4,
id. at 66-71, as opportunistic, but there is at least a strong implication that he views the
other two cases as involving opportunistic behavior as well. See id. at 99-100 (referring
to Cases 1 through 4 as "opportunistic breaches").
12. Id. at 60-71.
13. Id. at 72-79.
14. Wonnell does not distinguish among different expectation remedies or in
particular between expectation damages and specific performance. In fact, he suggests
that specific performance would be the appropriate remedy in one of his examples. Id. at
60 (Case 1). I will follow his lead in this section and focus mostly on the choice between
expectation damages and reliance damages.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 62-63.
17. Id. at 63-66.
18. Id. at 66-71.
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Wonnell has little difficulty showing what all four breaches have in
common. In all four cases, there is no problem with the contract at the
time the parties make it, and no circumstances change after the parties
enter into the contract to make the contract more costly or less desirable
to the promisor. Thus, in each case, the promisor has no moral or
economic justification for breaching. The real question, however, is
why expectation damages are superior to reliance damages in such
circumstances. To answer this question, Wonnell turns to moral
intuition. 9 Unlike some law and economics proponents, I have no
objection to moral intuition. In fact, my intuition concurs with
Wonnell's here. Yet one gets the sense that Wonnell is not completely
comfortable (as I am not) resting solely on moral intuition, at least
without some further explanation of or justification for that intuition.
Wonnell recognizes that law and economics analysis, with its focus on
incentives, deterrence, and efficiency, is a natural candidate for such a
supplement or complement to moral intuition. Thus, he makes some
references to economic arguments in discussing his examples and in the
following section of his article." Indeed, the fact that he labels this
section of the article "Six Motives for Making and Then Breaking a
Particular Contract'1, suggests that he is at least somewhat concerned
with the promisor's incentives. In my view, however, Wonnefl misses a
good opportunity in this section to make concrete the connection
between moral intuition and economic analysis. I think his article would
be stronger if it explored this connection, because I think the two
approaches point in the same direction in these cases and inform each
other in interesting ways. In the following sections, I sketch out three
aspects of the economic analysis of opportunistic breaches raised by
Wonnell's first four examples: promisor incentives to breach; promisee
incentives; and imperfect enforcement."
19. Wonnell's main justifications for the expectation remedy in the four examples
are the following: "If the right thing is for the promise to be kept, it seems
counterintuitive to unwind the transaction. ... " Id. at 61. "Expectation-based remedies
send th[e] message [that the original promise should be kept] most clearly ... .- Id. at
63 (Case 2). "The problem is... that the promise has been broken, and the restoration
of the status quo ante seems a preposterous answer to the wrong." Id. at 63-64 (Case 3).
"[R]isk allocations... would be upset if every time ... one could escape the contract by
merely paying reliance damages." Id. at 71 (Case 4).

20. E.g., id. at 68-69, 75-78, 79-88.
21. Id. at 60.
22. Wonnell discusses several other aspects of the economic analysis of contract

remedies that are more appropriate for the changed circumstance cases than for

1.

OpportunisticBreaches and PromisorIncentives

From an economic perspective, when breaches are opportunistic, the
goal of contract damages should be to deter the breach. Expectation
damages are superior to reliance damages under this analysis because
expectation damages tend to deter opportunistic breaches while reliance
damages do not. To see why this is so, we must go back to the notion of
opportunistic breach. Although there are different ways to define
opportunistic breach,' one of the features that Wonnell's examples
highlight so well is that opportunistic breaches all involve the promisor
attempting to expropriate from the contractual relationship some gain
determined to be illegitimate according to the intentions of the parties or
some broader social norm. Thus, the basic argument against reliance
damages for opportunistic breach comes down to this: reliance damages
generally do not deter opportunistic breach because they are more likely
to allow the promisor to keep some of this illegitimate gain. Expectation
damages, by contrast, generally deter opportunistic breach by depriving
the promisor of his illegitimate gain. To my knowledge, law and
economics scholars have not focused on this justification for expectation
over reliance damages."
This focus on the illegitimate gain to the promisor naturally leads to
the question of why the remedy should not be restitution rather than
expectation. Wonnell does not consider the role of restitution in contract
remedies. Of course, Wonnell is free to limit his analysis to expectation
and reliance, but in my view he again misses a good opportunity to show
the relationship among the three remedies and to show further why
"restitution" as normally defined in contract law might not always be
sufficient to deter opportunistic breach. The reason is that the "benefit"
retained by the breaching promisor may exceed the benefit from the
particular contract breached, and so might not be recoverable under a
traditional restitution remedy. To see these points, let us consider
opportunistic breaches. These include the possibility of renegotiation, id. at 83-84, and
promisor precautions, id. at 84-85.
23. For my attempt to summarize some of the existing definitions and offer one of
my own, see George M. Cohen, The Negligence-OpportunismTradeoff in Contract Law,

20

L. REv. 941, 953-61 (1992).
24. The classic economic justification for expectation over reliance damages is that
reliance damages will not deter inefficient breaches, which involve situations where
circumstances change after the formation of the contract to make the contract sufficiently
more costly or less desirable to the promisor that the promisor regrets the contract, but
not so much so as to make nonperformance socially desirable because the promisor's
costs outweigh the benefits of the contract to the promisee. See, e.g., A. MrrCHELL
HOEsTRA

POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS

31-34 (2d ed. 1989). As noted,

Wonnell addresses situations in his first four examples in which no circumstances
change after formation.
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Wonnell's first four examples.
In Case 1, the baseball trading card case, the promisor hopes to keep
the benefit of the promisee's performance (the promisee's card) without
"paying" the agreed return performance (the promisor's card).2 In this
example, the promisee's reliance interest is the return of his own card,
which is also arguably the promisee's restitution interest.'
The
promisee's expectation interest is the promisor's card, which exceeds the
promisor's reliance interest because under the assumption that the
contract was desirable when made, the promisee must value the
promisor's card more than the duplicate card the promisee gave up.
What makes the example interesting is that protecting the promisee's
reliance interest appears to be sufficient to deter the promisor's
opportunistic breach because the reliance remedy deprives the promisor
of her illegitimate gain, the promisee's card. What, then, is the
economic justification for preferring the expectation remedy?
Wonnell takes a stab at an economic analysis by suggesting that the
expectation remedy is Pareto superior to reliance because completing the
performance by the promisor would make both parties better off than the
reliance remedy of returning the promisee's card.27 But this argument is
not completely satisfying. If the expectation remedy would truly make
both parties better off than the reliance remedy, then once a court
determined that the promisor's keeping the promisee's card without
trading one in return was a breach, there would be no dispute about the
remedy and, therefore, no need for the court to get involved. Thus, the
choice between expectation and reliance becomes at least pragmatically
uninteresting. The choice becomes interesting only when either the
promisee or the promisor would, for some reason, prefer the reliance
25. Wonnell, supra note 1, at 60.
26. One could conceive of the restitution interest as the promisor's duplicate card
on the theory that this card rather than the promisee's card is the "illegitimate gain" that
the promisor is obligated to give up. Cf. RESTATE.MENT (SECOND) OF COiXACTS § 371
(1981). Under this conception, the restitution and expectation interests are the same in
this example. The conception of restitution I discuss in the text comports with the idea

that restitution involves a benefit conferred by the promisee on the promisor, see id. §§
344(c), 370, and that it is a backward-looking, not forward-looking remedy. See
generally Avery Katz, Reflections on Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: A Positive Economic Framework, 21 J.L REFOMI 541 (1988)
(defining restitution as putting the promisor in the ex ante position). The ambiguity of

the restitution concept cuts in favor of the expectation remedy in this example.
27.

Wonnell, supra note 1, at 61 ("Indeed, it seems misguided to return the Sosa

card, which makes both Jack and Jill worse off than they would be if the promise were
fulfilled").

remedy to the expectation remedy, so that forcing the expectation
remedy on the parties makes one worse off (according to his own
preferences). But if the promisee prefers the reliance remedy and seeks
the return of his card-say out of spite or because he now wants to
punish the promisor by trading with someone else (Wonnell's example
does not make clear whether either party has alternative trading partners
available)-I see no reason why the promisee should be forced to accept
an expectation remedy. (Although Wonnell seems to suggest that the
promisee not be allowed to opt for reliance, I doubt he really means it.)
Thus, the only interesting case occurs when the promisorwants to resist
the expectation remedy and thwart the original deal. Why might the
promisor be motivated to do that?
To answer this question, we have to imagine why the promisor has
acted the way she has in the first place. One possibility is that the
promisor intended to keep the promisee's card from the beginning
because the promisor thought that the promisee would be passive about
enforcing her rights (as Wonnell suggests), or would not have sufficient
resources to do so, or that the court would somehow make a mistake. If
that is what the promisor was doing originally, then returning the
promisee's card to the promisor, thus returning the promisor to her ex
ante position, leaves her in precisely the same position to try her scam
again with a new promisee who may be more passive about protecting
his rights or more resource-constrained. Therefore, if there is a potential
for such future gain to the promisor, the reliance remedy (which is the
traditional restitution remedy as well) will not sufficiently deter the
promisor's opportunistic behavior.
In contrast, the expectation remedy (or at least specific performance)
makes future misbehavior by the promisor more costly by depriving the
promisor of her duplicate card, which probably has much less value to
her than it does to others. Granted, she might be better off in the shortrun under the expectation remedy, but because she prefers the reliance
remedy she must value the bargaining power that the duplicate card
gives her for future scams more than the value of the card she originally
contracted to get. The expectation remedy takes this bargaining
advantage away, and thereby punishes the promisor. Thus, the reliance
remedy in this situation would be socially bad-not so much because it
could thwart an ex post efficient contract, but because of the undesirable
incentive effects it would have on opportunistic promisors.
The other way to justify the expectation interest in Wonnell's first
example is to tweak the example slightly to make the promisee's
reliance interest less than restitution. Whenever reliance is less than
restitution, reliance damages will not be sufficient to deter the promisor
from opportunistic breach because the promisor will be able to keep
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some gain from her wrongful conduct. Wonnell himself offers a
variation of this sort in which he posits the baseball card trade as part of
a larger contract in which the promisee has received some extra benefit
from the promisor.' In this variation, the promisee's reliance interest
would be zero-and so, less than restitution, defined as the benefit the
promisee conferred on the promisor-until the promisee's losses started
to exceed the received benefit. This example is somewhat forced, but
the point is correct, and the example shows that once reliance is
separated from restitution, reliance is no longer sufficient to deter
opportunistic breach.
There are several other ways, however, to reach the same result that
may seem less artificial. One would be to change the example from a
barter transaction to a sale. If the promisee pays the promisor in advance
for the card, but the promisor then uses the money for some other
investment and refuses to give the card to the promisee, the promisor's
benefit (the profit on the investment) could exceed the promisee's
reliance. Thus, a reliance remedy would not be sufficient to deter the
opportunistic breach. In contrast, the expectation remedy would impose
a cost on the promisor for using the promisee's money and, therefore,
more likely deter the opportunistic breach."
Alternatively, if we change the example from a goods contract to a
services contract, the underdeterrence problem with the reliance remedy
resurfaces. Suppose the promisee performs services for which the
promisor has not yet paid, and the promisor refuses to pay the contract
price. Unlike the goods case, the loss to the promisee from performing
may diverge from the value to the promisor of the performance; that is,
the reliance interest again may be less than the restitution interest. If the
promisor can breach and pay only reliance damages less than the
contract price, the promisor would not be deterred from committing
opportunistic breaches (at least by reliance damages alone), because the
promisor would be able to get the services he originally contracted for at
the contract price for a lower price. The point is that whenever the
reliance remedy is less than the restitution interest, awarding reliance
damages allows the promisor to breach and keep some illegitimate gain,
28.

Id. at 63.

29. Posner argues for a restitution remedy in such a case. See POSNER, supra note
7, at 130-31. In this case, restitution might exceed expectation and so provide a stronger
deterrent to opportunistic breach. In my prior damages article, I discuss examples for
which restitution might be a superior remedy to expectation. See Cohen, supra note 4. at

1274-78, 1290-1309.

thus insufficiently deterring opportunistic breach. The expectation
remedy is superior because it deprives the promisor of this gain, and so
deters opportunistic breach.
Case 2 o differs from the first mainly in that the benefit the promisor
seeks to expropriate is not reliance by the promisee that immediately
benefits the promisor, but a renegotiated contract price, or in economic
terms, a redivided contractual surplus.' After the promisee makes a
relationship-specific investment, the promisor subsequently seeks to
expropriate extra benefit by forcing the now vulnerable promisee
to agree to a modification in the contract price, even though no
circumstances other than the promisee's reliance investment have
changed to justify the modification. Extortionary modifications of this
kind are another classic type of opportunistic behavior, and as Wonnell
recognizes, courts have responded with various doctrines that allow the
promisee to escape such modifications even after fully performing. It
seems straightforward to argue that in the course of relieving the
promisee from the obligations imposed by the modification, courts
would not, and should not, suggest that the promisee be limited to a
reliance recovery on the original promise. To do so would allow the
promisor to retain the benefit of the promisee's full performance at a
more advantageous price than the contract price to which the parties
originally agreed, simply because the promisor extorted a modification.
That would encourage, not discourage, extortionary behavior by
promisors.
Somewhat oddly, Wonnell takes a different tack, which (perhaps
unnecessarily) complicates the problem but gets to the same place. He
argues that the contract law doctrines for policing extortionary
modifications are inadequate. As a result, the real problem is the
promisor's threat to breach if the promisee does not agree to the
modification, and the possibility that the promisor might carry out this
threat to breach to make the threat credible, if the promisee resists the
modification.32 The threat to breach if the promisee does not agree to an
extortionary modification would itself be an anticipatory repudiation of
the contract, 33 entitling the promisee to an expectation remedy. But
30. Wonnell, supra note 1, at 63-66.
31. Timothy J. Muris, OpportunisticBehaviorand the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN.
L. REV. 521 (1981).
32. Wonnell, supra note 1, at 62-63.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 250, cmt. d (1981).
But where a party wrongfully states that he will not perform at all unless the
other party consents to a modification of his contract rights, the statement is a
repudiation even though the concession that he seeks is a minor one, because
the breach that he threatens in order to exact it is a complete refusal of
performance.
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Wonnell does not take this tack either, presumably because determining
whether there has been a repudiation is fraught with the same difficulties
as determining whether an agreed upon modification is enforceable.
Instead, he focuses on a breach by the promisor after the promisee
refuses the modification.
Again, however, Wonnell's example is somewhat contrived. It
requires the extortionary promisor to pick a promisee victim who turns
out not so vulnerable as the promisor first assumed, and so calls the
promisor's bluff by suing him, rather than agreeing to the modification
or acquiescing in the breach. Moreover, the promisor not only picks a
victim poorly, but carries out the threat to breach even though the
promisor loses (again in the short run) by this action. Wonnell posits
that the promisor could gain in the long run by developing a reputation
as an extortionist who carries out threats when resisted. Of course, just
why other promisees would agree to contract initially with a promisor
having such a reputation is not clear, but Wonnell could have in mind
existing contracts with other promisees. Assuming Wonnell's scenario
is plausible, Wonnell's example poses the same problem as the first
example. Namely, the reliance remedy might be sufficient to discourage
the promisor from breaching because, not having received any benefit
from the promisee, the promisor forced to pay reliance damages would
be worse off than if he had performed once the promisee rebuffed the
promisor's proposed modification. Wonnell resolves the difficulty by
retreating to the moral argument that the promise should simply be
kept. 5 But this argument is, once again, unsatisfying.
Just as under the first scenario, a better argument is that although the
reliance remedy may leave the promisor without any benefit from the
current contract, it may not be sufficient to deprive the promisor of his
potential gain in other transactions; therefore, the reliance remedy is not
sufficient to deter future opportunistic behavior. On the other hand, the
expectation remedy makes future extortionary behavior much more
costly to the promisor and so much less likely to occur. Suppose, for
example, that the promisor has five identical contracts with five
promisees, only one of whom the promisor expects to be vulnerable to
an extortionary modification. In each contract, the promisee pays $200
Id. illus. 9.
34. Wonnell, supra note 1, at 63.
35. Id. ("In short, where the proper moral action is for the promise to be kept. the
reliable moral response is vindication of the expectation interest.").

and makes a reliance investment of $10 expecting to earn $500 from the
contract. Suppose, to follow Wonnell's example, that the promisor
attempts to extort a modification of the contract price to, say, $300 from
the first promisee, but the first promisee refuses and the promisor
breaches. If the promisor is liable only for reliance damages of $10,
even though the promisor appears to be worse off by $10, the promisor
could still come out ahead if one of the remaining four promisees agreed
to the modification and the rest got reliance damages, since $100 (the
extortionary gain from the compliant promisee) is greater than $40 (the
total reliance damage payments to the resistant promisees). If, however,
the promisor must pay expectation damages of $500 to the first promisee
(the most the promisor would be able to extort from any one promisee),
the promisor will have much less of an incentive to play the extortion
game. Even if the promisor could extract $100 from each of the
remaining four promisees, it would not be enough to compensate for the
damage payment to the first promisee.
Wonnell's third example of opportunistic breach (Case 3) involves a
promisor refusing to carry out an agreed-upon allocation of risk (the
most common situation being an insurance contract).36 The main
difference between this example and the previous two is that the
promisee's vulnerability is not caused by his own actions (giving a
valuable good to the promisor in Case 1 or making a reliance investment
in Case 2). Rather, some change in circumstances occurs that, absent the
contract, would create a loss for the promisee, but that the promisor has
agreed to bear under the contract. Again, Wonnell simply asserts that it
would make no sense to protect the reliance interest in these cases.37 He
then spends most of his efforts rebutting two arguments made by
reliance theorists in addressing risk allocation questions: first, that
conceiving of reliance as foregone opportunity gives the same outcome
as expectation; and, second, that risk allocation is not an important
function of most contracts.38 I agree with Wonnell's criticism of the
latter point and find his discussion of the first point a theoretical
distraction.
The interesting question to me is how this example compares on
deterrence grounds to Wonnell's previous two examples. In contrast to
the previous two examples, in Case 3 reliance damages are plainly
inadequate to deter breach once the contract is made. If the insurer has
agreed to pay the promisee's losses, but, upon breach, need pay back
36. Id. at 63-66.
37. Id. at 63-64 ("The problem is... that the promise has been broken, and the
restoration of the status quo ante seems a preposterous answer to the wrong.").
38. Id. at 64-67.

[VOL. 38: 137, 2001]

Finding Faultwith "Two ContractualWrongs"
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

only the promisee's premium, the insurer will breach every time. The
real question is whether reliance damages would deter the insurer from
making the contract in the first place, because the insurer, even though
better off than if it had to perform under its obligation, gets no benefit
from the contract with the insured if it has to return the premium.
But once again, this argument ignores the fact that there are benefits to
the promisor outside of this particular transaction that the reliance
remedy does not include. In fact, the insurance example makes this
point particularly clear. An insurance company typically contracts
simultaneously with multiple insureds, a few of whom will incur losses
during the policy period and most of whom will not. Insurance
companies base premiums on the expected payout averaged over all
insureds. If insurance companies could breach their obligations by
simply returning the premiums to those insureds who incurred losses, the
insurance companies would get a huge short-run windfall, because they
would still get to keep the premiums from the vast number of insureds
who have not suffered losses, while substituting the small return of
premiums in place of huge payouts for the insureds who have suffered
losses. This is a classic "Heads I win, tails you lose" situation, which
would benefit insurance companies in the short run though it could lead
to the collapse of the insurance market in the long run. Thus, the
traditional reliance remedy (defined as return of the premiums rather
than foregone opportunity) does not deter opportunistic breach by
insurers. Indeed, the belief that even expectation damages do not deter
opportunistic breach by insurers has given rise to awards of punitive
damages for bad faith breach in insurance contracts.
Outside the insurance context, any contract with a risk allocation
component (for example, a warranty) will generally involve a party who
contracts with many other parties either simultaneously or sequentially
and who expects that the risk will not occur in the majority of these
contracts. In fact, it makes sense to define contracts with a risk
allocation component as those for which these conditions exist. These
include commodities contracts in a thick market for which the relevant
risk is a change in the market price. In the absence of an expectation
remedy, promisors in such markets would, in response to a
disadvantageous price shift, simply breach their contracts, pay the small
reliance damage remedy, and contract with someone else at the new
price level. But the point of risk allocation contracts is to prevent such
behavior, just as the point of insurance contracts is to protect insureds

against rare but catastrophic loss. The expectation remedy deters the
opportunistic evasion of agreed upon contractual risks by depriving the
promisor of illegitimate gain. The reliance remedy does not.
Wonnell's final example of opportunistic breach (Case 4) involves the
promisor's expropriation of the promisee's private information. 9 In
certain situations, we think that the promisee should be able to take
advantage of information he has, but the promisor does not, to make an
advantageous contract. The generally understood rationale for such
contracts is that we want to encourage the promisee to invest in
information, so we reward the promisee by allowing him to make
beneficial deals with the less knowledgeable. As Wonnell recognizes
and discusses, deciding when we have such situations is often difficult.
But assuming that we have such a contract, then I agree that the
expectation remedy is superior to the reliance remedy narrowly defined.
The problem for owners of information is that once they reveal it, they
cannot take it back, at least without court intervention. Thus, absent the
expectation remedy, an opportunistic promisor would have an incentive
to make a contract with a promisee who has superior information,
discover that information, then breach and use the information himself in
a subsequent contract. To use Wonnell's example, suppose the promisee
knows that a piece of the promisor's property is likely to contain oil, but
the promisor does not; as a result, the promisee contracts to buy the
promisor's property for a cheap price. ° If the promisee then discovers
oil and the promisor breaches, the promisor may not simply pay the
promisee the promisee's reliance expenditures. The problem with the
reliance remedy is that, once again, it bears no relation to the ill-gotten
gain the promisor has taken from the contract (unless reliance is defined
broadly as the value of the information the promisee discloses to the
promisor after contracting). In this case, the gain comes from the
information. The reliance remedy allows the promisor to acquire
valuable information from the promisee at a below-market pricenamely, reliance damages. We do not want promisors using contracts as
a vehicle to free-ride off of the promisee's valuable investments in
information because that will discourage such investments.
The
expectation remedy measures the value of the promisee's information to
the promisee. If, faced with the prospect of paying expectation damages,
the promisor originally contracted to sell his property rather than buy
information about it, the promisor would be much less likely to want to
pay the promisee her full value for the information than he would be to
perform his contractual obligations. Thus, once again, the expectation
39.
40.

Id. at 66-71.
Id. at 68.
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remedy deters promisor opportunism, whereas the reliance remedy does
not.
To sum up the lesson for promisor incentives from Wonnell's
opportunistic breach examples, the reliance remedy inadequately deters
opportunistic breach because the gain to the promisor from opportunistic
behavior exceeds the promisee's reliance interest. The expectation
remedy, because of its forward-looking aspect, is much more likely to
deprive the opportunistic promisor of this gain. Additionally, there is an
important connection in these examples between economic analysis and
moral intuition to the extent that morality judges behavior good or bad
depending on the likely consequences of universal adoption of that
behavior. Similarly, from an economic perspective, it is when one
thinks about the effects of the breach beyond the particular transaction at
issue that the inadequacy of the reliance remedy to deter opportunistic
breach becomes most evident.4'
2.

OpportunisticBreachesand PromiseeIncentives

The desire to deter opportunistic breach and the resulting focus on
promisor incentives leads, in my view, to a sufficient justification of
expectation damages in cases of opportunistic breach. Thus, one could
argue that promisee incentives in cases of opportunistic breach may
simply be ignored. I believe, however, that it is important to see that
concern with promisee incentives provides a complementary argument
in favor of expectation damages for opportunistic breach-if only to
provide a useful comparison to the nonopportunistic breach cases, for
which Wonnell recognizes the importance of promisee incentives. 2
If the breach is opportunistic, and so the promisor should have
performed, limiting the promisee to reliance damages encourages the
promisee to adopt wasteful mitigation and precautionary measures,
including reducing reliance (such as in Case 2), not contracting, or
contracting at a discounted price. Promisee precautions in these cases
are wasteful in the sense that if the breach is opportunistic, the cheaper
"precaution' or "mitigation" would be for the promisor to perform the
contract than for the promisee to take protective action." Of course,
41. Wonnell finds the connection between economics and morality in Hayek's
social evolution theory, under which surviving social institutions (such as morality) tend
to be those that facilitate economic success. Id. at 80-81.

42. Id. at 83, 85-88, 89-90.
43. Cohen, supra note 4, at 1252-53.

even under an expectation regime, some doctrines are designed to reduce
full expectation damages because of promisee incentive concerns.
Moreover, promisees do not rely solely on expectation remedies to
protect them against promisor opportunism. They engage in a variety of
self-help measures, from progress payments, to deposits, to security, to
vertical integration. My point is simply that promisee protective
measures would increase under a reliance damage regime and that total
costs would likely be higher than under an expectation regime with
fewer promisee precautions.
Because there is no significant difference in terms of promisee
incentive effects among Wonnell's opportunistic breach cases, I will
offer only two quick examples. First, to take the easiest case of the four,
Case 3, it is hard to believe anyone would buy an insurance policy
knowing that the only remedy for the insurer's failure to pay would be
the return of the premium. Second, in Wonnell's extortion threat case
(Case 2), awarding only reliance damages when the promisee rebuffs the
promisor's extortionary modification proposal would just make
promisees more likely to agree to such extortionary modifications in the
first place. For example, if after contracting, the promisee has made a
$10 reliance expenditure that is useless outside the contract, and would
earn $50 from the contract that the promisee could not earn elsewhere,
the promisee would be willing to spend up to $50 to get the promisor to
perform. If the promisee could get only reliance damages of $10 by
resisting the modification, the promisee might be inclined to agree to the
modification to protect his reliance investment. If the doctrines for
policing extortionary modifications are as ineffective as Wonnell
maintains (a point of which I am not convinced), the promisee would
then be stuck with the modified contract. If the promisor contracts with
many promisees, chances are that some would agree to the modification
and the promisor's opportunistic conduct would not be deterred. On the
other hand, if the promisee has the club of expectation damages with
which to beat back the opportunistic threat and subsequent breach, the
promisor's opportunistic behavior would be deterred. Expectation
damages protect the promisee against the full potential extortion amount.
3.

OpportunisticBreaches and Imperfect Enforcement

Imperfect enforcement, including court error and transaction costs,
probably motivates many contract breaches, and the risk of such
imperfections can often tip the scales in favor of one contract damage
remedy or another. In his article, Wonnell does not purport to rely on
imperfect enforcement to justify the expectation remedy for
opportunistic breach. Nevertheless, some of his explanations at least
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implicitly rely on imperfect enforcement and, sometimes, imperfect
enforcement can be a useful complement to his explanations. More
important, imperfect enforcement becomes crucial to Wonnell's
discussion of nonopportunistic breaches. Thus, as with promisee
incentives, I think it is worth flagging the issue in the opportunistic
breach discussion as a basis of comparison. The problem in many
discussions of contract damage remedies is that only selective
imperfections are discussed, and it is hard to tell why other
imperfections are omitted. Because I find some of that bias in
Wonnell's article (as I am sure it exists in my own work), I think it is
important to try to be as careful and complete as possible in using these
rationales.
One type of imperfection is the difficulty in telling whether a breach is
opportunistic. Wonnell discusses this problem in the example involving
information, in which he focuses on the difficulty of drawing the line
between fraudulent concealment and protection of one's investment in
information. But, of course, similar difficulties exist with the first three
examples as well. In the baseball trading card example, the promisor
might claim that the promisee breached by providing a card of the wrong
quality (for example, a different year than the promisor wanted). In the
extortion case, the promisor could claim that some change in
circumstances justified the modification. In the risk allocation case, the
promisor could claim that a particular risk was not allocated, or was
beyond the accepted risk allocation range. The point is simply that in
many contract cases, the bulk of the dispute is deciding in which
category certain behavior belongs rather than deciding what
consequences should follow from some behavior once everyone agrees
on what the behavior is.
A second type of imperfection involves a problem in contract doctrine
other than damages doctrine. Wonnell relies on this type of imperfection
in his discussion of Case 2 when he asserts that the contract rules for
policing extortionary modifications are ineffective." But is this doctrine
really less predictable than the doctrines of contract formation,
interpretation, and excuse? Even if it is, the question remains why
contract damage rules should be formulated taking these doctrinal
imperfections as a given rather than trying to improve the errant
doctrines directly. In fact, the whole area of how rules of liability and
44.

Wonnell, supranote 1, at 62-63.

damage rules should relate to each other is one that deserves fuller
treatment.
A third type of imperfection, one that Wonnell fails to discuss,
involves the costs of bringing suit. When the reliance interest is smaller
than expectation (as it is in Wonnell's first four examples), there is
always a risk that reliance damages will drop the plaintiff below the
threshold level needed to make a lawsuit profitable. Thus, even if the
reliance remedy could theoretically deter opportunistic breaches, as a
practical matter the deterrent effect would be lessened once the costs of
suit are taken into account.
B. NonopportunisticBreaches
Wonnell's first four examples demonstrate that there is a strong
theoretical justification for the expectation remedy in cases of
opportunistic breach--even stronger than Wonnell recognizes. I have
tried to flesh out the theory in terms of deterrence rather than simply
moral intuition, but I think Wonnell would probably find most of that
theory supportive of his position. Wonnell's last two examples
demonstrate the theoretical justification for the reliance remedy in cases
of nonopportunistic breach. In these examples, the promisor breaches
not to expropriate some illegitimate gain, but rather to avoid a loss that
would result if the promise were performed. As I argued in my damages
article, once the potential for promisor opportunism is gone, the contract
problem becomes more like a tort problem of how to deal with
accidental loss.45 But to many economists there is not much difference
between appropriating a gain and avoiding a loss. Thus, the theoretical
question is what makes the losses "accidental" in these cases.
Wonnell's answer, with which I agree, is that the loss is the
"unanticipated" result of a contractual "mistake," so full performance of
the contract no longer makes sense.4 6 If full performance of the contract
no longer makes sense, then the expectation remedy, which is explicitly
designed to encourage performance, seems ill-suited for the situation.
The expectation remedy will over-deter promisors, in the sense that they
will take too many precautions to avoid mistakes. Reliance damages, by
contrast, will lead to optimal promisor precautions against mistaken
contracts. 7
45. Cohen, supra note 4, at 1245-46, 1258.
46. Wonnell, supra note 1, at 72.
47. Again in discussing the nonopportunistic breach cases, Wonnell casts his
argument in moral terms rather than in deterrence terms. Id. at 74-75 (reliance damages
in Case 5 would be more "fair" and "just"), 77 (reliance remedy in Case 6 "removes the
harm that is caused by the mistaken choice"). Wonnell discusses the deterrence
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As Wonnell fully recognizes, however, the problem is how we decide
which losses are "unanticipated" and which contracts are "mistakes."
One standard we could use to make the judgment is the joint profitability
standard (otherwise known as cost-benefit analysis or the Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency criterion).' Under this standard, if, after the contract is
entered into, a contingency arises, or information surfaces, that makes
the costs of performance to the promisor exceed the benefits of
performance to the promisee (that is, the contract becomes jointly
unprofitable), the court should view the contingency or information as
unanticipated and the contract as a mistake. On the other hand, if the
contract remains jointly profitable despite the change in circumstances
or information, courts should not treat the contract as a mistake.
But joint profitability is neither a sufficient nor necessary criterion for
distinguishing nonmistaken from mistaken contracts. Joint profitability
is not sufficient, because, among other reasons, it fails to differentiate
"unanticipated" losses (as in Wonnell's Case 5) from "agreed upon risk
allocations" (as in Wonnell's Case 3). For instance, the fact that an
insured event comes to pass may, in some sense, make the insurer's
contract with the insured who suffers a loss "jointly unprofitable," but
no one would argue, by that fact alone, that courts should view the
contract as "mistaken" or the loss "unanticipated." Put more broadly,
opportunistic behavior can still occur in contracts that have become
jointly unprofitable' 9 Not only is joint profitability an insufficient
condition for distinguishing nonmistaken from mistaken contracts, but
Wonnell makes an original contribution by pointing out that it is not a
necessary condition either. Wonnell's Case 5 (a case involving a mutual
mistake about the value of a fake diamond)' is in a sense "jointly
profitable" because the promisor's losses from having to perform are
completely offset by redistributive gains to the promisee. Yet Wonnell's
characterization of the case as a mistaken contract is sensible.
If joint profitability will not work, at least as a complete standard, then
how else are we to determine whether a contract is a mistake or a loss is
unanticipated? The easy answer is, of course, that by definition the
parties have "consented" to risk allocations but not to unanticipated
justification for reliance in the next section of the paper. Id. at 86.
48. WonneU discusses this criterion in connection with Case 4, id. at 68. and Case
6, id.
at 76.
49. Cohen, supra note 4, at 1241-42.
50. Wonnell, supra note 1, at 72-74.

losses. But again, that simply raises the question of how we know what
risks the parties have consented to undertake. 5 This question, of course,
is perhaps the most important and most vexing in contract law. In some
cases, the parties' intentions will be relatively certain, but in many cases
they will not.
In the uncertain cases, Wonnell's discussion of
opportunistic breaches may help shed some light on the issue.
1. NonopportunisticBreaches and PromisorIncentives
In Wonnell's first three examples, the opportunism problem arises
from the fact that the promisor, if faced with the reliance remedy rather
than the expectation remedy, could turn an apparent loss into a gain by
contracting with other promisees on the original contract terms. The
baseball card trader could try to find another, more passive, promisee;
the situational monopolist could try to extort modifications from other
promisees; and the insurer could collect premiums from other promisees
who did not incur losses covered by the policy. In Wonnell's last two
examples, by contrast, the promisor is not in a position to go to other
promisees with the same deal to recoup its losses on the first deal and
make an extra profit on top of that. Therefore, the expectation remedy is
not needed to deter the promisor from opportunistically breaching, and
in fact would over-deter promisors by leading them to take excessive
precautions against mistaken contracts.
In Case 5, both the promisor and the promisee are (by assumption)
mistaken about the value of the item the promisor sold, which turns out
to be much less valuable (the fake diamond, the less than super
computer) for both parties than either one anticipated. Once the
promisor discovers the information, any deal he makes with subsequent
promisees will be on less favorable terms to the promisor than the
original deal. There is no potential for future gain to the promisor
arising out of his contractual behavior, and so no justification for
presuming opportunistic breach or awarding expectation damages.
Contrast this case with the similar Case 4, in which the promisor sells an
asset that turns out to be more valuable than the promisor anticipated."
This extra value is what gives rise to the possibility of opportunistic
behavior by the promisor seeking to escape contractual liability to make
51. Id. at 75 ("The interesting question is what kind of substantive and remedial
scheme the parties to a contract would want to govern contractual mistakes that threaten
significant redistribution.").
52. The famous mistake case, Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887),
presents exactly this situation. The majority treats the case as a Case 5 mistake, in which
neither the buyer nor the seller thought the cow was pregnant; the dissent views the case
as a Case 4 information appropriation problem, in which the buyer deliberately used his
private expertise to make a good deal for the cow he suspected might be pregnant.
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use of the new information in future deals. Of course, it is possible that
in Case 5 the promisor could achieve illegitimate gains by either
behaving fraudulently in the original contract or in any subsequent
contract; that is, the promisor might have known the value of what he
was selling from the start and misrepresented that value to the promisee.
If the promisee can prove that the promisor engaged in this type of
opportunistic behavior, there is no justification for limiting the
promisee's damages to reliance, or even to expectation." But unlike the
first four cases, opportunistic behavior in Case 5 cannot reasonably be
presumed simply from the fact of breach by the promisor. The claim of
mistake is as facially plausible as the claim of fraud.
Case 6,4 the efficient breach situation, involves a service contractor
whose costs unexpectedly rise above the buyer's valuation. Although
this situation closely resembles the risk allocation scenario of Case 3,
again the key difference is that there is no reason to presume that the
promisor by breaching is able to expropriate some illegitimate gain in
other contracts. Unlike the classic market contract, in this case the
promisor is not breaching to sell his services to another buyer at a
market price more advantageous than the original contract price? And
unlike the classic insurance contract, in this case the promisor bears
some risk of loss associated with the higher cost contingency, whether or
not he performs the contract. Thus, the promisor has no obvious way to
breach opportunistically to achieve an illegitimate gain in another
contract. It is possible that the contract nevertheless could be interpreted
as having a risk allocation component. The promisee may be buying
insurance not to protect against loss, but to lock in gain.? Alternatively,
53.

WonneU, supra note 1, at 86-87.

54. Id. at 75.
55. If the contract is for goods, however, the seller's costs might increase at the
same time the market price increases. Cf id. at 76 n.69 (identifying problem of "mixed
motive" cases), 82 (discussing the problematic application of efficient breach theory to
the case of a second buyer who values the goods more than the frst buyer). Thus, the
possibility of opportunistic breach still exists. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 1323-28
(discussing effect on market damages rule when more than one variable changes).
56. One might argue that one of the features that makes Peevyhouse r. Garland
Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), such a controversial case is that it is
possible to view the Peevyhouses' claim that they were buying insurance against the
disfigurement losses caused by the contractor's digging as more plausible than a claim
that they were buying insurance against lost profits from the failure to get coal royalties.
Another feature of the case is the possibility that the coal company acted
opportunistically by delaying in notifying the homeowners of its intention not to
perform. See Cohen, supranote 4, at 1269-70.

a contractor may have a portfolio of contracts, some of whose costs turn
out lower than expected and some of whose costs turn out higher than
expected. Under such circumstances, buyers might agree to a fixed price
on the understanding that they would get full performance if the
contractor's costs unexpectedly rise and no price discount should the
contractor's costs unexpectedly fall. Because there is no obvious
opportunistic expropriation of gain by the promisor, however, these
kinds of risk allocation contracts should not be easily presumed; rather,
the promisee should bear the burden of proving that the parties intended
to allocate risk this way. Otherwise, courts should view the breach as
nonopportunistic and the reliance remedy as superior to expectation for
creating optimal promisor incentives.
2.

NonopportunisticBreaches and PromiseeIncentives

An alternative, complementary, criterion for distinguishing nonopportunistic breaches from opportunistic breaches is to focus on
promisee incentives. Under this criterion, in ambiguous cases courts
should be more willing to view losses as unanticipated and contracts as
mistakes-and, therefore, more willing to use reliance damages rather
than expectation-if doing so creates better incentives for promisees.
One application of this approach would be for courts to deny expectation
damages if they suspect that the promisee is behaving opportunistically,
that is, the promisee is the most likely opportunist. For example, in the
Case 6 scenario the promisee might, as Wonnell suggests, exaggerate the
value of the contract to him for the purpose of extorting a larger payment
from the promisor to escape the contract. 7 Alternatively, in Case 5 the
promisee might deliberately seek to make contracts with vulnerable or
ignorant promisors." As Wonnell recognizes, however, it may be
difficult to distinguish the opportunistic promisee from the 2Rromisee
legitimately exploiting an information advantage, as in Case 4. Where
promisee opportunism is a potentially serious problem, courts ought to
be skeptical of claims of full insurance by the promisee, because a
rational promisor would worry about promisee moral hazard in deciding
whether to provide such insurance.
But relevant promisee incentives do not include only promisee

57. Wonnell, supra note 1, at 83. The classic case is Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent,
129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921). For a discussion of how the court's analysis can be viewed as
identifying proxies for promisee opportunism, see Cohen, supra note 23, at 990-1000.
58. Wonnell, supra note 1, at 88 ("If the promisee is not the innocent victim of a
careless promisor's mistake but rather the purposeful exploiter of known mistakes, there
is no reason to award reliance damages to the promisee.").
59. Id. at 86-87.
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opportunism. They also include incentives to take precautions (such as
restraining reliance), and to mitigate losses. Wonnell only briefly
mentions these incentives,60 perhaps because they do not seem
particularly relevant to Case 5 and Case 6. In my view, however,
promisee incentives of this sort are a crucial component of contract
damage rules. Doctrines such as mitigation, foreseeability, and certainty
all serve to improve promisee incentives to take precautions and mitigate
losses. Reliance damages have the same effect. In fact, the application
of the so-called limitations on the expectation remedy often leave the
promisee with reliance damages or something very close to it.6
Moreover, the kinds of cases in which these doctrines usually arise (such
as negligent delay in delivery or negligent performance that cannot be
replaced or undone) often seem to fit the description of nonopportunistic
breach. Although they are not "mistake" cases, they are in some sense
"impossibility" cases (full performance is no longer possible), and do
involve "unanticipated" loss. Wonnell should probably have added a
seventh category for these cases.
3.

NonopportunisticBreachesand Imperfect Enforcement

In discussing the efficient breach case (Case 6), Wonnell makes an
important argument that although reliance damages may be theoretically
preferable to expectation, once we take into account imperfect
enforcement, this advantage may disappear. Wonnell's point, a standard
one in the economic literature on efficient breach, is that because courts
often do not know whether nonperformance is truly efficient or not, the
expectation damage measure can serve as a "pricing mechanism" to sort
out efficient nonperformance from inefficient breach." If the court and
the promisor can measure the promisee's expectation interest accurately,
the promisor will breach and pay expectation damages only when the
value to the promisor from breaching exceeds the cost to the promisee.
This point plays an important role in Wonnell's "theoretical
reconciliation of expectation and reliance" and his subsequent
development of principles of contract remedies, and also serves as his
60. Id. at 89.
61.

Compare id. at 75 (arguing that reliance damages, if "measured correctly,"

include incidental expenses and, more contentiously, consequential damages), with id. at

89 n.105 (stating that the various doctrines limiting the expectation recovery "may result
in damages that are between reliance and expectation").

62. Id. at 78.

principal ground for criticizing my fault-based theory of contract
damages.63
I have no problem with the pricing mechanism theory as a justification
for the expectation damage measure in certain cases. I believe, however,
that the pricing mechanism theory has to be considered as one of a
number of ways that imperfect court enforcement might affect the choice
between expectation and reliance, and that its benefits must be balanced
against the potential incentive costs, such as the effect of overcompensatory remedies on promisee incentives. Thus, the theory is not
a sufficient justification for expectation damages in all "efficient breach"
cases.
The first response to the pricing mechanism theory (also well
recognized in the economic literature) is that it assumes that it is easier
for courts and promisors to measure the promisee's expectation interest
accurately than it is for them to determine whether a particular breach is
efficient. But one can certainly imagine cases in which the promisor's
costs of performance have increased so dramatically that we are
confident that they exceed any reasonable measure of the promisee's
expectation, even though the precise expectation is hard to determine.'
Granted, one could still argue that the expectation measure is justified
because the expectation measure saves on information costs by requiring
only one piece of information (the promisee's expectation) rather than
two (the promisee's expectation and the promisor's costs). In fact,
however, all the court and the parties must know to apply a fault
standard is that the promisor's costs are likely to be bigger than the
promisee's expectation. The court and the parties need not accurately
measure either variable.
A second response to the pricing mechanism theory is that the posited
information cost savings will often be illusory. As long as contract law
has excuse doctrines-such as mistake, impossibility, and frustrationthen whenever the promisor sees fit to raise these defenses, the court will
have to consider the promisor's costs as well as the promisee's
expectation to decide whether or not to apply these doctrines.6 '
Moreover, information about the promisor's costs may be relevant not
63. Id. at 88-90, 106-09.
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2)(b) (1981) (rejecting the
cost of completion remedy "if that cost is ...clearly disproportionate to the probable
loss in value" to the promisee); cf. id. § 351(3) (allowing exclusion of lost profit
recovery to avoid "disproportionate compensation").
65. Cf. Michelle J. White, Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due to
Impossibility: A Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 357-58 (1988) (advocating that
courts should abandon any attempts to determine whether or not breach has occurred or
whether performance should be excused, and instead should simply apply expectation
damages in all cases of nonperformance if both parties are risk neutral).
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only to excuse doctrines, but also to formation doctrines (such as
promissory estoppel), performance doctrines (such as good faith), and
other damage doctrines (such as mitigation and foreseeability), which
may require balancing the promisee's costs of mitigation and precaution
against the promisor's costs. Contract law also includes many doctrines
with a reasonableness component, which may require all sorts of
information beyond the promisee's expectation.
If one of these
doctrines is potentially applicable in a particular case, contract law does
very little to cut off information relevant to distinguishing among breach
types when parties think it is worth the effort to produce such
information. The doctrines that exist in contract law for cutting off
information (such as the parol evidence rule and the objective theory of
contract) are directed not at saving information costs per se, but at
reducing biased information and opportunistic skewing of such
information.
A related response to the pricing mechanism theory is that the greater
the concern with promisee incentives, the less value expectation has as a
pricing device. Wonnell argues that we can take care of the promisee
incentive problem by judicial balancing, and then use the gricing
mechanism to set correctly the promisor's incentives to breach. But
once we acknowledge that judicial balancing is necessary, much of the
benefit of the pricing mechanism disappears. The main benefit of the
pricing mechanism is to ensure that promisors do not breach when it
would be inefficient for them to do so. However, if promisee incentives
are such a big concern that courts find it desirable to limit the promisee's
expectation recovery through doctrines like mitigation or foreseeability,
the promisee's damages are reduced from "full" expectation and moved
in the direction of reliance (perhaps all the way to reliance or even to
less than a full reliance recovery). Once we accept those limitations, the
argument that an explicit "reliance" remedy in similar cases would
encourage inefficient breach seems overstated.
Another way to view this point is to recognize that in applying the
contract doctrines limiting expectation, courts already have implicitly
concluded that the promisee is the most likely opportunist, the least cost
avoider, or the better mitigator, and that concerns about promisor
opportunism are less significant. In fact, if promisee incentives are the
main concern in a particular dispute, one could argue that the "pricing
66.

Wonnell, supranote 1, at 88-89.

mechanism" theory favors reliance damages, because reliance damages

will be more likely than expectation to provide the optimal incentives for

the promisee. 67 Suppose, for example, that the court is uncertain about
the extent to which it should reduce expectation damages to create
optimal promisee incentives, but the court is nonetheless certain that it
should reduce damages to some degree. Awarding reliance damages is a
good information-saving compromise to encourage promisee precautiontaking or mitigation, whereas awarding expectation damages would be
more likely to provide insufficient incentives for promisees.
Additionally, it is important to remember that imperfect enforcement
is not limited to the efficient breach scenario. In particular, courts may
find it difficult to determine whether they have a nonopportunistic
breach like Wonnell's Case 5 (the fake diamond example) or an
opportunistic breach.' Indeed, some famous mutual mistake cases pose
precisely those difficulties. 69 Yet Wonnell does not advocate using
expectation damages to avoid making difficult determinations of mistake

and unanticipated loss.

One reason that might explain and justify

67. The standard economic analysis of contract remedies holds that reliance
damages will not provide the optimal incentives for the promisee, because if reliance
damages fully insure the promisee's reliance investments, the promisee will overinvest in
the contract and not take into account the potential nonperformance of the contract. Of
course, expectation damages do no better on this score. One answer to this objection is
that doctrines such as mitigation and foreseeability can be used to limit reliance
recoveries as well as expectation recoveries. Compare id. at 88 (foreseeability and
mitigation doctrines solve promisee incentive problem), with id. at 93 n. 120 (expressing
skepticism about idea of "efficient reliance" outside of mitigation). It is true that to the
extent that restricting the promisee's recovery to less than his full reliance expenditures
is necessary, the "pricing mechanism" justification for reliance is weaker. But so is the
pricing mechanism justification for expectation in this example, since expectation,
properly limited, is already less than reliance.
68. Wonnell criticizes my damages article for insufficiently appreciating the Case
5 problem and for being too willing to award expectation damages in that case. Id.at
108-09. Wonnell is correct that I did not focus on the Case 5 situation, and his point that
mistaken contracts can be redistributive is a good one. However, the Case 5 situation
seems to fit my category of contracts that should not have been made, for which I did
advocate reliance damages. Moreover, Wonnell's greater willingness to award reliance
damages in Case 5 than in Case 6 depends largely on his greater confidence in courts'
ability to identify Case 5 situations than Case 6 situations.
69. See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887), discussed supra n.52.
See also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(excusing Alcoa from long-term aluminum supply contract on ground that both parties
mistakenly thought price index term would sufficiently protect Alcoa, with Alan
Greenspan playing the part of Dumb). Alcoa could easily be viewed as a Case 3 risk
allocation situation, in which Alcoa had a portfolio of contracts, some of which were
winners and some of which were losers. See Victor P. Goldberg, Price Adjustments in
Long-Term Contracts, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 527. One response to that argument is to focus
on the behavior of Essex, which resold much of the aluminum at a large profit rather
than using it internally as the contract contemplated, thus belying an "insurance"
justification for full performance by Alcoa.
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Wonnell's confidence that courts can identify Case 5 situations (as well
as Cases 1 through 4) is that courts use a variety of devices for reducing

uncertainty-from looking for the least cost avoider or better mitigator
or most likely opportunist, to focusing on the particular context of the

deal, to examining hypothetical intent based on assumed rational
behavior.

But all of these techniques are available to analyze the

efficient breach scenario of Case 6 as well.
I do not mean to suggest that I am unsympathetic either to Wonnell's

legitimate concerns regarding imperfect enforcement, or to the potential
benefits of expectation as a pricing mechanism. I would address this
problem somewhat differently, however. I would argue that it makes
sense to presume that a contract breach is opportunistic unless the
promisor can meet the burden of showing that the breach is

nonopportunistic.

In my view, this presumption is reasonable, not

because of the desirability of the pricing mechanism, 70 but rather

because, given the availability of expectation damages for opportunistic
breach, most litigatedbreaches will likely be opportunistic even though

most breaches will likely be efficient. In practical terms, this approach
does not differ significantly from

onnell's. Our main difference may

come down to little more than a dispute over how high the promisor's
burden should be for overcoming the presumption.

m.

WONNELL'S Two PRINCIPLES

I need not dwell too long on Wonnell's two principles. 7' For the most
70. Wonnell, supra note 1, at 78, 89, 91, 108. WVonnell also argues that
expectation is the preferable general rule because four out of his six cases involve
opportunistic breach for which expectation is preferable. This seems to me meaningless
bean counting but it is not clear how much weight Wonnell really intends to put on this
justification.
71. Id. at 90. Wonnell's two principles are:
Principle1. Unless the parties otherwise provide and subject to Principle

2, the measure of damages following a breach of contract is the amount needed
to take the promisee from the position she actually occupies--or, if the
promisee has behaved unreasonably after the contract was entered, the position
the promisee would have occupied had she behaved reasonably-to the
position the promisee would have occupied if the promise had been fulfilled.
Principle2. When the court judges that conditions (A) through (C) are all
present, the measure of damages following a breach of contract is the amount
needed to take the promisee from the position she actually occupies--or, if the
promisee has behaved unreasonably after the contract was entered, the position
the promisee would have occupied had she behaved reasonably-to the
position the promisee would have occupied if the promise had not been made:

part, these principles seem reasonable to me-though, as usual, the devil
is in the details. I have already made most of the criticisms I have of the
principles in discussing the earlier sections of Wonnell's article; thus, in
this section I will briefly focus on aspects of Wonnell's principles that I
have not previously addressed.
The most important aspect of the principles for me is that they both
acknowledge an explicit, independent role for both expectation and
reliance remedies, and explain that the choice between the two remedies
requires some court analysis of relative fault and the reason the breach
occurred. As I stated in the introduction to this Article, this idea is the
most controversial part of Wonnell's article and, in some sense, he
spends the rest of the section trying to keep a lid on the fullest possible
implications of his proposal. Thus, Wonnell makes a strong pitch for
expectation as the dominant remedy;72 advocates abolishing or severely
restricting the penalty clause doctrine;"' and throws up three hurdles to a
reliance recovery (all of which the promisee must surmount).74 In my
view, these restrictions are something of a smokescreen to mask what
some might otherwise consider a radical proposal. I do not think the
proposal is radical; in fact, I think it is quite reasonable and broadly
descriptive of what courts actually do. Thus, my overall criticism is that
Wonnell should embrace the implications of his principles rather than
try to run from them. Let me turn to a few specifics.
First, Wonnell puts in a plug for strong enforcement of liquidated
damage clauses. He argues with great flair that there is no reason "why
all substantive terms of the contract should be treated with great judicial
deference while all remedial terms are subject to strict scrutiny." ' This
Article is not the place for a full discussion of liquidated damage
clauses, but several points deserve mention. The idea that courts strictly
scrutinize liquidated damage clauses, but not other terms, is literally true
but somewhat misleading. The reason is that often courts' "strict
(A) Full enforcement of the contract would be unjust by virtue of
extreme and unreasonable hardship to the promisor caused by a mistake or
change in circumstances that was not within the risk provided for in the
contract expressly or by implication.
(B) The promisor is nevertheless at fault for having made an
unconditional promise to the promisee which the promisor could reasonably
have expected to induce, and which has induced, detrimental reliance by the
promisee.
(C) The promisor has not behaved unreasonably with respect to her
contractual responsibilities.
Id.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 91.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 92-98.
Id. at 92.
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scrutiny" of other contract terms shows up in adjustments to courtimposed damages, rather than as an explicit expulsion or revision of the
terms themselves. 76 To the extent courts typically use damage rules to
make fault-based adjustments, liquidated damage clauses can interfere
with those adjustments. That fact does not mean that courts should
throw out all such clauses. It does explain, however, why courts
scrutinize them closely: they are seeking to preserve the discretion to
police the contract for conduct such as promisee opportunism. If courts
adopted the rule of strict enforcement of all liquidated damage clauses,
my guess is that they would wind up relaxing the rules of formation,
performance, and excuse to do the policing. Moreover, in my view,
court policing of contractual opportunism is generally consistent with
the parties' intentions, and courts should not interpret the mere drafting
of a liquidated damage clause as a complete rejection of court policingthough I admit that this is a controversial view and requires a fuller
justification than I can give here. Suffice it to say that if courts
abandoned the penalty clause rule, I would be very surprised to see
many parties respond by writing contracts that contain a liquidated
damage rule providing for full expectation damages in all cases.
Second, Wonnell's principles include a requirement of "extreme and
unreasonable hardship to the promisor caused by a mistake or change in
circumstances that was not within the risk provided for in the contract
expressly or by implication." 77 Wonneli's defense of this requirement is
interesting. His intention is to distinguish the opportunistic breach cases
from the nonopportunistic breach cases, and I am in agreement with his
goal. But why is the "extreme and unreasonable" language necessary?
Is it that the kind of cases justifying reliance damages are extremely
rare?78 Or that courts are too likely to err in favor of reliance damages

76. For example, one way to interpret the famous Jacob & Youngs case is that the
court agreed that "Reading pipe" meant "Reading pipe" and not "Reading pipe or its
equivalent." But the court limited the damages for breaching the promise to use Reading
pipe to zero. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921).
77. Wonnell, supra note 1, at 90.
78. Id. at 108 ("In the normal run of cases, expectation damages would be applied
in order to obtain the informational benefits they provide in Motive 6 cases." (emphasis
added)); id.at 112 ("Principle 2 seeks to retain the pricing benefit of expectation
damages for the run of ordinary cases." (emphasis added)); cf. id.at 109 (noting the
"commercial practice, apparentlycomnon as judged by the many cases that have arisen,
of one-sided modifications of the contract price made in the face of some mistake or
change in circumstances" (emphasis added)).

rather than expectation?79 If so, why not apply the same "extreme"
requirement to other contract law doctrines that have the effect of
limiting recoveries, such as foreseeability, mitigation, certainty, and
diminution in value?
Wonnell cites to the much maligned
unconscionability doctrine and the problem of courts interfering
excessively in freely entered contracts.' Court interference may indeed
be excessive, but the point is that Wonnell's own scheme requires courts
to distinguish among breaches and assess fault. It could not be
otherwise; that is what courts do.
This point becomes clear once one considers Wonnell's principle
requiring the court to determine that the promisor has not behaved
unreasonably. Wonnell candidly admits that this requirement is the most
troubling for his attempts to cabin fault." Under this principle, courts
must make a judgment that the promisor has not acted opportunistically
before the promisor can succeed in limiting the promisee to reliance
damages. But even under Wonnell's statement of the expectation
interest, courts must make similar judgments regarding promisee
conduct (such as whether the promisee was reasonable in not
mitigating). Clearly, fault judgments in contract damages are both
difficult to do, and difficult to escape doing.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I have tried to stress two main points in this Article. First, Wonnell's
argument for the expectation remedy in cases of opportunistic breach is
stronger than he recognizes. The reliance remedy is not sufficient to
deter opportunistic breach, once one considers the potential gains to the
promisor from the opportunistic behavior beyond the immediate
contract. Second, Wonnell's argument for the reliance remedy in cases
of nonopportunistic breach is also stronger than he recognizes. The
pricing advantage of the expectation remedy is weaker than Wonnell
imagines, for several reasons. First, many contract doctrines require
courts to evaluate the very information they supposedly do not need to
apply the expectation remedy. Second, doctrinal limitations on the
expectation remedy move the expectation and reliance remedies closer
together and so reduce the risk that a reliance remedy will result in an
inefficient breach. Third, courts may find it more important to use the
pricing mechanism to control promisee incentives rather than promisor
79. Id. at 108 ("If the court was mistaken in its cost-benefit calculation, an
inefficient breach would have been undersanctioned and similar breaches in the future
would be underdeterred.").
80. Id. at 94.
81. Id. at 95-97, 108.
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incentives. Thus, Wonnell's analysis provides a stronger theoretical
justification than he acknowledges for a fault-based damage regime, in
which the optimal damage measure depends on a court evaluation of the
reason the breach occurred-in other words, the regime we now have
but somehow refuse to see. In my view, the camel's nose of fault is
already under the tent, and we might as well learn to live with it. This is
not to say that Wonnell's concerns about the difficulties of administering
such a system are unfounded. Rather, these concerns suggest that our
theoretical energies should now be directed away from the abstract
superiority of expectation or reliance in general, and toward the
development of better presumptions of opportunistic and nonopportunistic breach.2 I welcome Wonnell's contribution to this
enterprise, and I hope that his efforts help move us toward a more moral
and efficient contract damage regime.

82.

Wonnell makes a similar suggestion in his conclusion. Id. at 133-35.
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